{"id":36641,"date":"2024-10-03T12:48:07","date_gmt":"2024-10-03T19:48:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/occupysf.net\/?p=36641"},"modified":"2024-10-03T12:48:07","modified_gmt":"2024-10-03T19:48:07","slug":"approval-voting","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/occupysf.net\/index.php\/2024\/10\/03\/approval-voting\/","title":{"rendered":"APPROVAL VOTING"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

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On an approval ballot<\/a>, the voter can select any number of candidates.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Approval voting<\/strong> is a single-winner electoral system<\/a> in which voters mark all the candidates they support, instead of just choosing one<\/a>. The candidate with the highest approval rating is elected. Approval voting is currently in use for government elections in St. Louis, Missouri<\/a> and Fargo, North Dakota<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Effect on elections<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Research by social choice theorists<\/a> Steven Brams<\/a> and Dudley R. Herschbach<\/a> found that approval voting would increase voter participation, prevent minor-party candidates from being spoilers, and reduce negative campaigning.[1]<\/a><\/sup> Brams\u2019 research concluded that approval can be expected to elect majority-preferred candidates<\/a> in practical election scenarios, avoiding the center squeeze<\/a> common to ranked-choice voting<\/a> and primary elections<\/a>.[2]<\/a><\/sup>[3]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One study showed that approval would not have chosen the same two winners as plurality voting (Chirac<\/a> and Le Pen<\/a>) in the first round of the 2002 French presidential election<\/a>; it instead would have chosen Chirac and Jospin as the top two candidates to proceed to the runoff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the actual election, Le Pen lost by an overwhelming margin in the runoff, 82.2% to 17.8%, a sign that the true top two candidates had not been found. In the approval voting survey primary, Chirac took first place with 36.7%, compared to Jospin at 32.9%. Le Pen, in that study, received 25.1% and so would not have made the cut to the second round. In the real primary election, the top three were Chirac, 19.9%, Le Pen, 16.9%, and Jospin, 16.2%.[4]<\/a><\/sup> A study of various \u201cevaluative voting\u201d methods (approval and score voting) during the 2012 French presidential election<\/a> showed that \u201cunifying\u201d candidates tended to do better, and polarizing candidates did worse, as compared to under plurality voting.[5]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Operational impacts<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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