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SEPTEMBER 26, 2022 (theatlantic.com)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Xi jinping should be enjoying his final days in charge of China. For decades now, the Chinese Communist Party has regularly replaced its senior leadership\u2014a system crucial to the nation\u2019s success\u2014and after 10 years in power, Xi would be due to step aside and allow a new team to guide the country\u2019s future. But when the country\u2019s top cadres meet in Beijing on October 16 for the 20th Party Congress, Xi is widely expected to break precedent and extend his rule for at least another five years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although this departure from custom has been mooted for years, the news might send a renewed chill down the spine of some in Washington, D.C. Xi has transformed China from the U.S.\u2019s potential partner to its chief strategic adversary. The Chinese leader appears determined to capitalize on his country\u2019s recently acquired wealth to challenge America\u2019s economic primacy, technological advantage, and military dominance, and even its assumptions about the global order that forms the foundation of American power. Five more years of Xi almost certainly means five more years of superpower competition, even confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That is the conventional wisdom. But maybe Washington should be grateful Xi is sticking around. China\u2019s leader definitely intends to roll back American global influence, but he may not be doing a good job of preparing his own country to attain that goal. The actual results of his policies suggest that he is weakening, not strengthening, China as a competitor to the United States. The longer Xi remains at China\u2019s helm, the less competitive the country may become.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lost amid the hype about China\u2019s ascent is just how poorly the country has performed under Xi\u2019s stewardship in nearly every aspect of policy. The economy has slowed dramatically. The leadership has given up on meeting its once-sacrosanct growth target. Xi\u2019s aggressive foreign policy has alienated most of the world\u2019s major powers and terrified China\u2019s neighbors in Asia. Many of Xi\u2019s high-profile government initiatives are marred by waste and mismanagement. China\u2019s rise, which Xi has called inevitable, is less, not more, certain because of his rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That alternative narrative has serious implications for American foreign and domestic policy. In response to Xi\u2019s belligerence, policy makers in Washington feel compelled to contest China on every front: diplomatic, economic, technological, military, and ideological. That was the thinking behind the recently signed CHIPS bill, which is designed to ensure America\u2019s continued mastery of the semiconductor industry against China\u2019s high-tech ambitions. The same strategy guided President Joe Biden\u2019s 2021 Build Back Better World, an infrastructure-building program intended to compete with China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative and vie for influence in the developing world. These policies were based on the premise that China\u2019s capabilities are keeping pace with Xi\u2019s ambitions. The evidence now suggests that Xi\u2019s aims are outstripping the country\u2019s capacity to sustain them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Read: No more \u2018strategic ambiguity\u2019 on Taiwan<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The timing of Xi\u2019s overreach is fortunate for Washington. Amid the partisan rancor and social disorder that has preoccupied the United States in the past five years, American global power has probably been more vulnerable than at any time since World War II. Xi could have taken advantage of that disarray to expand Chinese influence at America\u2019s expense. Instead, his actions have had the effect not only of keeping the U.S. in the game but also, in certain respects, of enhancing its global standing. The worldwide American network of alliances, which had come under severe strain, is arguably stronger now than it has been in years\u2014in part due to Xi\u2019s policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Xi\u2019s China remains a threat as the only country with both the intent and the resources to undermine the U.S.-led global order. Yet the failings of Xi\u2019s agenda show that the widely held assumption that China\u2019s rise is as unstoppable as American decline is simplistic. Xi wants to be written into the history books as the man who overturned Pax Americana. Instead, he could end up being the one who preserves it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When xi jinping claimed power in 2012, most China experts anticipated that he would follow the immensely successful path laid by the \u201cparamount leader\u201d Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s\u2014based on liberalizing economic reforms, integration with the global economy, and a partnership with the United States. Xi had previously served as an official in some of China\u2019s most economically vibrant regions, so he had long experience with Deng\u2019s central principle of \u201creform and opening up.\u201d Shortly before Xi became the country\u2019s new leader, he had had extensive interactions with then Vice President Joe Biden, which left the impression that Xi valued China\u2019s fruitful relationship with Washington.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As his rule has unfolded, however, those early assumptions have proved to be wrong. Highly ideological, fiercely nationalist, and obsessed with political control, Xi has deviated sharply from his predecessors\u2019 policies. In so doing, he has altered China\u2019s course in profound and unpredictable ways.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Most dramatically of all, Xi has entirely revised China\u2019s foreign policy. He apparently believes that China\u2019s moment to assume the status of the world\u2019s most powerful country has arrived. Rather than treating Washington as a partner, Xi considers the U.S. to be China\u2019s most dangerous adversary. Instead of immersing China in the American-led global order, Xi is promoting his own vision of a Sinocentric alternative, one that is friendlier to authoritarian regimes. Notably, the Chinese leader has forged a new friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who Xi seems to believe can be an ally in his quest to roll back American power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet the more openly hostile China has become to the current international system, the stronger U.S. alliances have grown. Xi\u2019s agenda has persuaded the world\u2019s democracies to tighten their ties to the United States and to one another in order to counter the threat he presents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Initially, European leaders were uncomfortable with Washington\u2019s tougher line on China, insisting on their \u201cstrategic autonomy.\u201d This divergence sowed some dissension within the Atlantic alliance. However, Xi\u2019s support for Putin amid Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine has gone a long way toward healing that rift. At a virtual summit in April, ostensibly meant to bolster cooperation between China and Europe, the leaders of the European Union criticized<\/a> Xi\u2019s pro-Russia stance, warning him against aiding Putin\u2019s war effort.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Then, in June, the leaders of Washington\u2019s four main partners in the Pacific\u2014Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand\u2014participated<\/a> in a NATO summit for the first time to discuss the Chinese threat. This was a sign that a more coordinated or fully united alliance that brought together the democratic powers in Europe and Asia might be possible. In addition, India\u2014usually wary of entangling itself in superpower competition\u2014has become more active in the Quad (a security partnership that also includes Australia, Japan, and the U.S.). This suggests that India sees the group as a potential bulwark against Beijing, which has alarmed Indian leaders by pressing territorial claims along the two countries\u2019 disputed border.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Read: Zero COVID has outlived its usefulness. Here\u2019s why China is still enforcing it.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Xi seems not to care about these effects of his actions. In mid-September, on his first international diplomatic trip since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, Xi chose to meet Putin, thumbing his nose at the United States and its European allies. He has also pressed ahead with his undiplomatic diplomacy, which has at times descended into threats and demands delivered by his appointees. In a July meeting with his Australian counterpart, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi blamed the two countries\u2019 strained relations on Canberra\u2019s \u201cirresponsible words and deeds.\u201d He went on to say that they could be improved\u2014if Australia avoided \u201cbeing controlled by any third party\u201d\u2014that is, the U.S.\u2014according to an official Chinese summary of the conversation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Shortly after that, China\u2019s foreign ministry directly threatened the U.S. that it would \u201cpay the price\u201d for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi\u2019s visit to Taiwan, which Beijing perceived as a violation of its sovereignty. (The government in Beijing considers Taiwan part of China.) A few days later, a senior Chinese official warned<\/a> the Israeli ambassador to Beijing not to allow the U.S. to influence Israel\u2019s approach to China, with a tactless claim that the Jews and the Chinese share a common grievance as victims of the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As a consequence of all this, China\u2019s image has deteriorated sharply around the world, according to a recent survey<\/a> of 19 countries, mostly major democracies, by the Pew Research Center. Xi himself fares poorly, too, with respondents in many countries expressing little or no confidence that the Chinese leader will \u201cdo the right thing\u201d in international affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China is perceived somewhat more favorably in parts of the developing world, and Beijing\u2019s foreign policy has become increasingly focused on winning support in what\u2019s called the \u201cGlobal South.\u201d But even there, Xi blunders. China, for instance, failed to corral the small nations of the South Pacific into a security and economic pact, in part because of Beijing\u2019s arrogance. Henry Puna, the secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum, a regional policy organization, said in a July briefing that local leaders had rejected the initiative because Chinese officials had presented them with fully drafted documents for the pact without consultation. \u201cIf anybody knows what we want and what we need and what our priorities are, it\u2019s not other people\u2014it\u2019s us,\u201d he said<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Xi isn\u2019t doing much better at home, particularly with China\u2019s economy. Growth has slowed significantly on his watch. In 2012, at the start of his tenure, the economy grew 7.8 percent, but this year the International Monetary Fund forecasts<\/a> a meager 3.3 percent expansion. A reduction in the rate of growth was probably inevitable as the economy developed, but Xi\u2019s policies have likely made matters worse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The key to China\u2019s decades-long economic boom was the withdrawal of state intervention in the economy and its opening to overseas trade and investment, which allowed private enterprise to thrive. To some extent, Xi has reversed that\u2014enough to undercut some of the most vibrant sectors of the economy and divert capital and talent into wasteful endeavors, such as a slate of state-led industrial programs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most obvious sign of that shift is the extensive new regulatory burden imposed on private companies. Some of it is well intentioned\u2014ensuring that food-delivery workers get better treatment, for instance\u2014but all of it has been introduced haphazardly and has curtailed the expansion of some of the country\u2019s most important companies. The once-flourishing private-education industry, which offered after-school classes for college-hungry kids, has suffered layoffs and heavy financial losses after an edict forbidding these businesses from making money out of teaching core-curriculum subjects to most students. One prominent technology firm, the ride-hailing app Didi Chuxing, has suffered so much harassment from a cybersecurity investigation and restrictions on its operations that its share price has plunged by more than 80 percent since its initial public offering a year ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Read: When Biden went to China<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead of propelling fresh economic growth, the tech sector as a whole has been downsizing and laying off employees. That has made jobs harder to find for recent college graduates: In July, youth unemployment reached an all-time high of nearly 20 percent (though it improved slightly in August).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Xi\u2019s motivations appear part ideological, part purely political. He seems to fear that Big Business, and especially the tech sector, could amass sufficient influence and wealth to pose a challenge to Communist rule. Party officials have said<\/a> plainly that they want greater control over the management of private enterprises, and Xi himself has spoken<\/a> of the \u201cneed to prevent the disorderly expansion and unchecked growth of capital.\u201d Xi prefers instead state-led endeavors that he can more easily superintend. The government has provided lavish investments, subsidies, and tax breaks to support industries that Xi\u2019s bureaucrats favor in sectors they want China to dominate, including electric vehicles, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although these industrial programs are in too early a phase to pass final judgment on, and there are a few signs of progress, the results so far are generally not encouraging. One observer, Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted<\/a> in a recent essay that in spite of huge government support, \u201cthere is almost no sector where China is the dominant technology leader.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the most high profile of these state-driven missions\u2014to develop a semiconductor industry advanced enough to make the country self-reliant\u2014has been plagued by corruption. To date, it has made<\/a> only glacial progress in catching up to industry leaders in the U.S., and has not come close to reducing the Chinese economy\u2019s dependence on foreign-made chips.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Xi\u2019s apparent distrust of free-market reforms has also exacerbated the economy\u2019s most dangerous weakness: its broken growth model. Chinese policy makers and economists worldwide have long warned that China\u2019s growth is too dependent on investment, which is often debt driven and excessive\u2014squandering resources on unnecessary apartments, factories, and infrastructure. Xi continued the practice of pumping credit into the economy whenever it slowed below the party\u2019s preferred target, and he\u2019s suffering for it today. Debt has risen steeply during Xi\u2019s tenure, from less than double national output in 2012 to almost triple today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The consequences are emerging in the bloated but vital property sector. A government attempt to rein in highly indebted developers led to a crisis last year at one of the industry\u2019s giants, Evergrande, and the sector\u2019s troubles have deepened. With developers defaulting, property sales falling, real-estate prices sinking, and new construction slumping, the instability of the sector represents a risk to the nation\u2019s banks, which are deep in property-related lending, as well as to the wealth of the country\u2019s middle class. In a remarkable indication of diminished public confidence, families across the country\u00a0recently engaged<\/a>\u00a0in a \u201cmortgage strike\u201d\u2014suspending payments on unfinished apartments out of concern that cash-strapped builders will never complete them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n (Contributed by Norma J F Harrison)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The United States does not need to take Xi Jinping\u2019s attempt to project power at face value. By\u00a0Michael Schuman SEPTEMBER 26, 2022 (theatlantic.com) Xi jinping should be enjoying his final days in charge of China. For decades now, the Chinese Communist Party has regularly replaced its senior leadership\u2014a system crucial to… Continue reading RECOMMENDED READING<\/h2>\n\n\n\n